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Small Island States are the most exposed and vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change, particularly sea level rise. Unfortunately, mitigation measures, building 
capacity for the vulnerable groups, or even the adoption of adaptation measures may 
not be a sufficient solution.  Instead, resettlement outside their country of origin may 
in some instances, be the only alternative. With resettlement however comes other 
issues, not least are the grounds under which they might qualify for another country’s 
protection. In this article, we examine the case of Ioane Teitiota, who in 2013 applied 
to Immigration New Zealand for refugee status under the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees as a ‘climate change refugee’. His application was refused because 
he failed to meet the current criteria required to demonstrate refugee status. Teitiota’s 
case, reflects what appears to be the dominant situation of displaced peoples who 
apply for refugee status on the ground of the impacts of climate change. Aside from 
the Convention, it is questionable whether the rights of people affected by climate 
change are protected under international law. There are a number of solutions mooted 
for resolution of the issue of climate displacement however as yet, none have gained 
international agreement. 
I INTRODUCTION 
‘Our entire survival is at stake.’ 
Kiribati president Anote Tong1 
In less than 40 years’ time,2 significant portions of Tarawa, the island upon which the capital 
of Kiribati is located, is expected to be subject to inundation.3  Sea level rise also threatens parts 
of the capital itself (South Tarawa) with all roads in one of the three main urban centres 
                                                     
* Mark Baker-Jones, B Prop LLB (University of Auckland), Partner, Environment, Planning and Climate Change, 
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of Technology (QUT), Faculty of Law.  
1 ‘Our entire survival is at stake’: Kiribati President Anote Tong Calls for International Community to Deliver on 
Climate Funding Pledge’ ABCNews (online), 11 July 2014 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-11/kiribati-
president-calls-for-urgent-climate-funding/5590202>. 
2 The World Bank, ‘Cities, Seas and Storms Managing Change in Pacific Island Economies: Volume IV Adapting 
to Climate Change’ (2000) 22 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPACIFICISLANDS/Resources/4-
VolumeIV+Full.pdf>; See, eg, Leonard A Nurse et al, ‘Small Islands’ in Vicente R Barros et al (eds) Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, And Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution Of Working Group 
II To The Fifth Assessment Report Of The Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) (This latest report tends to agree on the negative effects that Kiribati and Tarawa are likely to face). 
3 Kelly Wyett, ‘Escaping a Rising Tide: Sea Level Rise and Migration in Kiribati’ (2013) 1(1) Asian & The Pacific 
Policy Studies, 171, 171;  Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, ‘6.South Tarawa’ (2012) Republic Of 
Kiribati Island Report Series, 10 <http://www.climate.gov.ki/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/6_SOUTH-
TARAWA-revised-2012.pdf>. 
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potentially lost to storm surge and sea level rise by 2100.4 However, in even less time, long 
before the urban centres of South Tarawa are submerged, sea level rise could render large parts 
of Kiribati uninhabitable.5 Therefore, what are the occupants of Kiribati to do as their wells 
become salty,6 seawater destroys their crops, high tides and king tides wash the ocean into their 
homes,7 when what they need is protection on a non-political humanitarian8 basis from 
environmental endangerment?  
II PROTECTION UNDER THE CURRENT REFUGEE FRAMEWORK 
The current international legal framework holds few, if any, protections for the people of 
Kiribati faced with this situation.9 Certainly to date, those who have tried to gain recognition 
under legal mechanisms provided for refugees have had little success. With its origins in the 
first global body for inter-State cooperation, the League of Nations, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), was established, and continues to 
operate, for the purpose of providing international protection for refugees.10  To this end, the 
defining 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Convention’)11 came into 
existence. With such a Convention in place, it seems reasonable at first glance that an I-Kiribati, 
a person from Kiribati who seeks refuge due to the prospect of being forced to leave his or her 
homeland because of rising sea levels, could expect to find legal protection under such a 
Convention.  While it would seem intuitively logical for Ioane Teitiota (born on Tabiteuea atoll 
in the Republic of Kiribati, where life became ‘progressively insecure as a result of ocean 
inundation’12) to claim refugee protection under the Convention, in practice; the direct 
protection it offers for those affected by climate change is non-existent.   
The absence of protection provided to ‘climate refugees’ or, as more recently framed, ‘climate 
displaced persons’,13 is no better demonstrated than in Mr Teitiota’s case. As required by 
Immigration New Zealand,14 Mr Teitiota made a claim, in New Zealand, where he continued 
to reside unlawfully after the expiry of an initial permit,15 for recognition and protection as a 
refugee. Once made, the claim was reviewed by refugee and protection officers, but was 
                                                     
4 The World Bank, above n 2, 22. 
5 Jon Barnett and W Neil. Adger, ‘Climate Dangers And Atoll Countries’ (2003) 61 Climatic Change 321-337, 
326; Wyett, above n 3, 172;  Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO ‘Climate Variability, Extremes and 
Change in the Western Tropical Pacific: New Science and Updated Country Reports’ (2014) (Pacific-Australia 
Climate Change Science and Adaptation Planning Program Technical Report, Australian Bureau of Meteorology 
and Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Melbourne, Australia) 114, 131. 
6 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, [27]; Wyett, above n 3, 172. 
7 Teitiota  v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173,  [37]. 
8 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), ‘Self-Study Module 1: An Introduction to International 
Protection. Protecting Persons of Concern to UNHCR’ (1 August 2005) 7 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4214cb4f2.html>.  
9 International Bar Association, ‘Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption’ (July 
2014) Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report, 7. 
10 UNHCR, ‘Self-Study Module 1: An Introduction to International Protection. Protecting Persons of Concern to 
UNHCR’ above n 8, 7. 
11 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954). 
12 Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2013] NZHC 3125, 
[19]. 
13 Oli Brown, ‘Migration and Climate Change’ (International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 2008) 13-15.  
14 Immigration New Zealand, ‘Refugee Status Branch’ (June 2013) 
<http://www.immigration.govt.nz/branch/RSBHome/>. 
15 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107, [4]. 
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refused. The decision to refuse the claim was appealed, in the first instance, to the Immigration 
and Protection Tribunal (‘IPT’), which, although finding Mr Teitiota credible and his account 
acceptable ‘in its entirety’,16 upheld the refusal to grant protection.  Subsequent appeals to the 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court,17 including an application for leave to appeal to the High 
Court of New Zealand,18 led to the ultimate and final decision  at least to the limits of the New 
Zealand judiciary  to refuse protection. The overarching question for the decision maker in 
Mr Teitiota’s case (which was eventually the Supreme Court of New Zealand) was whether 
Mr Teitiota was able to bring himself within the terms of the Convention. The Supreme Court 
determined finally that he was not.19  
The following case note examines Mr Teitiota’s unsuccessful claim and his appeals. It 
considers the availability of protection for refugees based on the impacts of climate change 
under the Convention. It considers why the Convention does not afford a legal mechanism for 
international resettlement of people like Mr Teitiota, who seek to claim status as a climate 
change refugee, and concludes that unless the Convention is amended, ‘the world's first climate 
change refugee’20 is likely to be the last.21 
III  A MATTER OF OPTIONS AND AVAILABLE ACTIONS 
By way of general background, there is little doubt that climate change is already affecting 
Mr Teitiota’s homeland of Kiribati, a small island state and will continue to do so. The science 
of climate change produces varied projections, but in respect of the trend towards global 
warming and ensuing environmental impacts, it is generally consistent,22 particularly in respect 
of rising sea levels.23 This is, at the very least, disquieting for small island states24 as they will 
become, and indeed for some Pacific islands already are,25 the most exposed and vulnerable26 
nations to these impacts.27  They remain vulnerable because many of the islands are small and 
                                                     
16 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, [38]. 
17 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173; Teitiota v 
Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107. 
18 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107, [1]. 
19 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment SC7/2015 [2015] NZSC 
107. 
20 ‘World’s First Climate Change Refugee Has Appeal Rejected’, The New Zealand Herald (online), 13 May 2014 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11254252>. 
21 See, eg, Teitiota  v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173, 
[41] (The point this judgment makes is that climate change and its effects on countries like Kiribati is not 
appropriately addressed under the Refugee Convention). 
22 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, ‘Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol’ (2008) 50(6) 
Environment 8, 10; Climate and Development Knowledge Network, ‘The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report What’s 
in it for Small Island Developing States?’ (2014) 1  
<http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CDKN_IPCC_Whats_in_it_for_SIDS.pdf>. 
23 Nurse et al, above n 2, 1616.  
24 Ibid 1618. 
25 Ursula Rakova, ‘How to Guide for Environmental Refugees’  (2009) Ourworld  2.0 
<http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/how-to-guide-for-environmental-refugees/>. 
26 Nurse et al, above n 2, 1616-1617; Climate and Development Knowledge Network, above n 22, 3. 
27 Kate Morioka, ‘A Climate for Change: Understanding Women’s Vulnerability And Adaptive Capacity To 
Climate Change From Actionaid’s Rights-Based Approach – Case Studies From Papua New Guinea And Solomon 
Islands’  (2012) ActionAid Australia, 13 
<http://www.actionaid.org.au/images/stories/Blog/a%20climate%20for%20change_final.pdf>; Maryanne 
Loughry and Jane McAdam, ‘Case Study: Kiribati – Relocation And Adaptation’ (2008) 31  Forced Migration 
Review 51, 51. 
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low-lying,28 which affords them little, if any, adaptive capacity.29 Kiribati is no exception, with 
its many atolls and single raised coral island, and an average height of less than three metres 
above sea level.30 Current projections indicate climate change impacts will further reduce the 
size of many Pacific islands and atolls,31 increasing what is already a high risk of inundation32 
and leading to their foreseeable, if not inevitable, evanescence.33 Those who will fare worst 
from these impacts will be subsistence communities situated in small island states.34 In the face 
of sea level rise, the options for defensive action are limited. It is therefore likely that increased 
erosion, salinisation of water supplies and damage to the growing environments of community 
gardens will affect and limit food supplies.35 Salt-water is already contaminating gardens on 
some islands,36 leaving them unable to produce traditional crops.37 As a result, some island 
economies are becoming unviable.38   
A Mitigation, Resilience, Adaptation and Resettlement 
In terms of action, international attention has historically focused largely on mitigation rather 
than adaptation measures.39 However, mitigation alone may be insufficient and come too late 
to help many small island states.40 In the inescapability of sea level rise, additional mechanisms 
such as building resilience and adaptation are suggested.41 Resilience is one of the more recent 
additions to the narrative of solutions for climate affected persons.42 A complex term, in that 
the definition is somewhat fuzzy,43 the aim of resilience is to build capacity for particularly 
vulnerable groups in situ, or at least in-country, where possible. Methmann and Oels44 however, 
critique the resilience approach, asserting that the focus on resilience ‘opportunities’ ‘ignores 
                                                     
28 Nobuo Mimura et al, ‘Small Islands’, in Martin L Parry et al (eds) Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation 
and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2007) 689, 690; Nurse et al, above n 2, 1616, 
1618. 
29 Mimura et al, above n 28, 690; Morioka, above n 27, vii; See, eg, Nurse et al, above n 2 (This report does 
suggest that in cases adaptive strategies may be undertaken to limit the impact of sea level rise). 
30 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 80041, [13]; Wyett, above n 3, 171. 
31 Mimura et al, above n 28, 689-690; See, eg, Nurse et al, above n 2, 1616, 1618 (This later report reinforces the 
negative consequences on low lying atolls). 
32 Mimura, above n 28, 690; Nurse et al, above n 2, 1616. 
33 Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Climate Migrants: Legal Options’ (2012) 37 Procedia – Social and Behavioural Sciences 
86, 87.  
34 Mimura et al, above n 28, 698; Nurse et al, above n 2, 1616, 1621. 
35 Mimura et al, above n 28, 690. 
36 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Rising Seas force Carteret Islanders Out Of Home’, Lateline, 5 February 
2007 <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1840956.htm>. 
37 Rakova, above n 25; There Once Was An Island: Te Henua E Nnoho (Directed by Brian March, On the Level 
Productions, New Zealand, 2010). 
38 Leal-Arcas, above n 33, 88. 
39 Louise Kruger and Rowena Maguire, ‘The International Regulation of Persons Displaced by Climate Change’ 
in Angus Francis and Rowena Maguire (eds) Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Asia Pacific 
Region (Ashgate Publishers, 2013) 210; Eike Albrecht and Malte Paul Plewa, ‘International Recognition of 
Environmental Refugees’ (2015) 45(2) Environmental Policy and Law 78, 79. 
40 Leal-Arcas, above n 33, 87. 
41 Ibid 86; Kruger and Maguire, above n 39, 210-211. 
42 See, eg, The Nansen Initiative, ‘Agenda for The Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context 
of Disasters and Climate Change Final Draft’ (2015) iv <https://www.nanseninitiative.org/global-consultations/>. 
43 Chris Methmann and Angela Oels, ‘From “Fearing” To “Empowering” Climate Refugees: Governing Climate-
Induced Migration In The Name Of Resilience’ (2015) 46(1) Security Dialogue 51, 53. 
44 Ibid. 
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the destruction, loss and violence triggered by climate change’ and ‘avoids all rights-based 
language’.45 
With regard to adaptation, both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ adaptation measures46 can be employed to 
contribute to effective coastal adaptation. Nonetheless, where the means of adaptation are 
available locally, they can be costly.47 These costs, for example, the costs of building sea walls, 
can make the employment of adaptation mechanisms infeasible48 and equally, the mechanisms 
may not effectively address the risk.49 There may also be cultural beliefs and a ‘lack of 
awareness’, which act as a barrier to implementation of adaptation measures, not to mention 
the absence of technological and human resources.50 This suggests that neither approach offers 
the one perfect solution. 
So is there another option? One adaptation measure of course, and one that may become ‘a 
necessity’, is to relocate, either internally or across borders.51 Population movement52 and 
displacement53 have already been attributed to ‘environmental degradation’54, yet resettlement 
is often considered to be a measure of last resort.55 Nevertheless, displacement through 
voluntary and forced internal and external migration is anticipated to increase,56 and while the 
IPCC acknowledges the potential is there, there is still a lack of evidence to support the 
contention that migration has become a true response to climate change.57   
IV A MATTER OF DISPLACEMENT, MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT 
As highlighted, displacement may occur either internally or across international borders.  
Internal migration is anticipated to represent the greater proportion of movement stimulated by 
climate change impacts.58 Internal migration or displacement is primarily the responsibility of 
                                                     
45 Methmann and Oels, above n 43, 61, 62, 64. 
46 See, eg, Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘Hard and Soft Paths for Climate Change Adaptation’ (2011) 11 Climate Policy 
1177 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2011.579315>.   
47 Nurse et al, above n 2, 1625, 1626, 1638; Climate and Development Knowledge Network, above n 22, 1-2; 
Laurence Caramel, ‘Besieged By The Rising Tides Of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys Land In Fiji’, The Guardian 
(online), 1 July 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-
levu>; Urvashi Narain, Sergio Margulis and Timothy Essam, ‘Estimating Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change’ 
(2011) 11 Climate Policy 1001 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2011.582387>. 
48 Leal-Arcas, above n 33, 87; Wyett above n 3, 173. 
49 Nurse et al, above n 2, 1638. 
50 Ibid 1640. 
51 Mimura et al, above n 28, 708; Nurse  et al, above n 2, 1641; Wyett, above n 3, 173. 
52 Mimura et al, above n 28, 711. 
53 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection and Planned Relocations in the Context of 
Climate Change’ (2012) Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (Elizabeth Ferris) 4. 
54 See, eg, discussion on ‘environmental migration’ in Jerrold W Huguet, ‘The Demography of Environmental 
Migration’ (2012) 8 Asian Population Studies 121 
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17441730.2012.684539>; Trudy Ann Cameron and Ian T 
McConnaha, ‘Evidence of Environmental Migration’ (2006) 82 Land Economics 273 
<http://le.uwpress.org/content/82/2/273.short>. 
55 Kruger and Maguire, above n 39, 203. 
56 See, eg, ‘FEATURE: Should International Refugee Law Accommodate Climate Change?’ UN News Centre 
(online), 3 July 2014 <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48201 >; Kruger and Maguire, above n 
39, 202-203; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection and Planned Relocations in the 
Context of Climate Change’ (2012) Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (Elizabeth Ferris) 7. 
57 Nurse et al, above n 2, 1625. 
58 Albrecht and Plewa, above n 39, 80; Matthew Lister, ‘Climate Change Refugees’ (2014) 17(5) Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy 618, 622. 
QUT Law Review Volume 15, Issue 2, 2015 
 
Page | 107 
 
the domestic government and is a matter for domestic law,59 while international migration will 
be determined by international law and the scope of domestic policies on migration.  
Appealing to rights for those faced with displacement, migration and resettlement, the rights 
with regard to climate change impacts are not clearly defined or understood at international 
law.60 This is particularly true prior to displacement when asserting rights as a basis of claim 
for protection, yet sea level rise and climate change in general may be said to impact on 
fundamental human rights.61 This is arguably and disproportionately so in vulnerable62 and 
indigenous communities,63 where justice may not be afforded equitably to women64 and 
children.65 While the protection of rights is often a matter of urgency,66 there is a lack of specific 
protection mechanisms for the less exigent cases; for example, where people are threatened 
with the longer term, forced displacement resulting from climate change impacts.67   
For those facing internal displacement, there may be some protection under domestic law or 
international human rights and humanitarian law.68 Displaced persons in this context however, 
are often unaware of their rights and government accountability may be lacking.69 Where 
governments have signed up to international Conventions which incorporate relevant rights, 
obligations may apply.70 Notably however, some small island states are absent signatories to 
major Conventions.71 Consequently, frustrations with responsible governments can arise. 
In searching for specific rights for protection, climate change may not be considered a direct 
violation of human rights,72 nor may a specific right be found to an environment of a particular 
quality.73  Nevertheless, in some circumstances climate change affects, amongst other rights: 
                                                     
59 Leal-Arcas, above n 33, 91; UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement’ (22 July 1998) E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998); See, eg, AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, [47] 
(As the case states, ‘internally displaced person cannot meet the requirements of the Refugee Convention’). 
60 Camilla Boana, Roger Zetter, and Tim Morris, Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding The 
Linkages Between Environmental Change, Livelihoods And Forced Migration (2008) Refugee Studies Centre, 
University of Oxford, 6 <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policy-briefings/RSCPB1-Environment.pdf>. 
61 Morioka, above n 27, 11. 
62 John von Doussa, Allison Corkery and Renée Chartres, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’ (2007) 14 
Australian International Law Journal 161, 162. 
63 Ibid 167. 
64 Morioka, above n 27; Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 
18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 August 1981).  
65 Jill Lawler, ‘Children and Climate Change: Children’s Vulnerability to Climate Change and Disaster Impacts 
in East Asia and the Pacific’ (2011) UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office 
<http://www.unicef.org/media/files/Climate_Change_Regional_Report_14_Nov_final.pdf> ; Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, opened for signature 29 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990);  
Donovan Burton, Johanna Mustelin, and Peter Urich, ‘Climate Change Impacts On Children In The Pacific: 
Kiribati And Vanuatu Technical Report’ (2011) (UNICEF, Bangkok). 
66 Boana, Zetter and Morris, above n 60, 11. 
67 Ibid; Kruger and Maguire, above n 39, 205. 
68 Leal-Arcas, above n 33, 91. 
69 Morioka, above n 27, ix. 
70 Von Doussa, Corkery and Chartres, above n 62, 168. 
71 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976). 
72 Kruger and Maguire, above n 39, 208. 
73 Von Doussa, Corkery and Chartres, above n 62, 163; Kruger and Maguire, above n 39, 208; Bridget Mary 
Lewis, The Human Right to a Good Environment in International Law and the Implications for Climate Change 
(Doctor of Philosophy, Monash University, 2014) i. 
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the right to life;74 the right to adequate food;75 and the right to clean water.76 For example, the 
impacts of climate change may directly or indirectly77 cause a significant enough reduction in 
food to cause a deterioration of health78 from malnutrition.79  Food shortages have already been 
felt in some small island states where gardens fail to flourish and government food aid is 
infrequent.80  Equally, the right to clean water has been used to support recent claims for refugee 
protection in New Zealand, as unclean water poses, particularly to children of small island 
states, a real risk of causing diahorrea and subsequent death.81 Rising sea levels also affect 
rights to freedom of movement,82 housing,83 and secondarily, education,84 where high tides and 
storm surges inundate community dwellings and local schools, rendering them unusable.85  The 
difficulty is finding protection for these rights under international law when the basal threat 
emanates from climate change.  
A Limited Legal Mechanisms 
Aside from rights-based Conventions there is, as yet, no direct international hard law 
instrument which addresses the plight of internally displaced peoples.86 Non-binding87 guiding 
principles for standards of protection and assistance exist.88 Under these principles, those 
internally displaced should enjoy the same rights and freedoms as other persons.89 Again, what 
is unclear is whether the rights extend and apply to ‘slow onset disasters’,90 such as gradual 
island sinking.91 Certainly, one solution mooted for the future is a new international legal 
                                                     
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) art 6(1); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UN 
GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 3. 
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) art 11(1), 12. 
76 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 
(10 December 1948) art 11, 12; Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 August 1981) art 14(2)(h); Von Doussa, 
Corkery and Chartres, above n 62, 164-165. 
77 Von Doussa, Corkery and Chartres, above n 62, 164. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid 166. 
80 Rakova, above n 25; Beenish Ahmend, ‘Pacific Islanders Threatened by Climate Change Face a Legal Black 
Hole’ Vice (online), 23 September 2014 <http://www.vice.com/read/pacific-islanders-threatened-by-climate-
change-face-a-legal-black-hole-923>.  
81 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, [19]; AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517-520, [15], [17], [27]. 
82 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/810 (10 December 1948) art 13. 
83 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) art 12; Kruger and Maguire, above n 39, 208. 
84 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/810 (10 December 1948) art 26; Kruger and Maguire, above n 39, 208. 
85 There Once Was An Island: Te Henua E Nnoho (Directed by Brian March, On the Level Productions, New 
Zealand, 2010). 
86 Albrecht and Plewa, above n 39, 80-81. 
87 International Bar Association, above n 9, 7. 
88 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998). 
89 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998) Principle 1. 
90 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, [39]. 
91 Leal-Arcas, above n 33, 91. 
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instrument which incorporates, or ‘provides a platform for adoption’, of these principles within 
national legal systems.92 
International displacement is a different matter. States are only responsible at international law 
for the human rights of a foreign national once he or she has entered the responsible country.93  
Those migrating internationally due to environmental factors arguably do not meet 
‘persecution’ requirements under the definition of ‘refugee’, an essential element when seeking 
to obtain refugee status.94 Neither do they make up a recognised group to which the definition 
applies.95 The connection to common environmental risk is insufficient,96 and current case law97 
seems to uphold this restrictive definition.98 International law does not otherwise support a right 
to unrestricted international movement.99 The non-refoulement principle (that is, avoiding the 
forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected 
to persecution),100 whilst arguably a basis for supporting a claim for refugee status, is subject 
to the domestic immigration policies of the receiving state, none of which make provision for 
those claiming permanent climate change related immigration.101  Further, where there is a case 
for environmental migrants, causation is an issue. A range of causes may result in migration or 
displacement.102 While economic and growth in population density are often the final push in 
a degrading environment,103 there must firstly be a link between climate change and the 
environmental change, and subsequently, a link between the environmental change and the 
decision to migrate.104 These factors, as will be demonstrated, are relevant to Mr Teitiota’s case. 
B Negative Impacts of Displacement and Resettlement 
Irrespective of whether an instrument or framework offering protection for the climate 
displaced can be found, negative impacts can be attributed to resettlement for indigenous island 
populations105 and need to be considered. Particularly in cross-border migration, there is the 
risk that the deprivation of customary land may not only lead to a loss of cultural identity106 
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and tradition,107 but that displacement may cause a radical and fundamental change in how the 
population sustains itself.  For example, Carteret Islanders relocating to mainland Bougainville 
plantations must abandon their traditional occupation as ‘fishermen’ and become 
agriculturalists.108 Language, ‘religious practices’,109 and ‘self-determination’ may also be 
affected.110 Moreover, comprehensive resettlement (and even the more critical ad hoc 
relocation111of refugees) still requires funding.112 Communities also face the prospect of being 
economically worse off,113 so that as well as losing their cultural connections to land114 and 
being faced with the challenge of having to integrate into culturally and socially different 
communities,115 the homeland loses potentially one of its key resources  its people.  For some, 
however, there is no other option,116 and so in Kiribati, as in other small island states, the 
prospect of resettlement has become a current reality. 
In the case at hand, Mr Teitiota’s claim is indicative of the general search for a resettlement 
solution. In his reasons for seeking refugee status, Mr Teitiota highlights the difficulties I-
Kiribati face with respect to climate change impacts. In 1931, Kiribati and South Tarawa had 
a combined population of 29 671.117 By 2012, the population had risen to 100 786.118  However, 
Kiribati itself has a land area of only 810 kilometres-square and, ‘under increasing climate 
induced sea level rise, the occurrence of extreme tide events is projected to increase’.119 The 
prospect for Kiribati in respect of climate change is increased coastal damage through erosion; 
infrastructure losses; reduced quality and quantity of water resources; damage to agriculture 
crops; and deterioration in public health.120 It is perhaps no surprise then that Ioane Teitiota, a 
citizen of Kiribati having lived in New Zealand since 2007, was reluctant to return with his 
family to his homeland. Mr Teitiota’s solution was to make a claim to Immigration New 
Zealand for recognition as a refugee on the basis that the changes to the environment in Kiribati 
caused by sea-level-rise associated with climate change made remaining in Kiribati intolerable. 
V A MATTER OF REFUGEE PROTECTION 
When seeking refugee protection the UNHCR and its conventions become relevant. The 
UNHCR was established to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees.  Its actions, as 
previously highlighted, are based on understandings and obligations set out in the relevant 
Conventions. New Zealand and Australia have been contracting states to the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (which, in this note, we refer to 
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collectively as the ‘Convention’), since 1954 and 1973 respectively. As a party to the 
Convention, New Zealand has agreed to ensure that asylum seekers who meet the definition of 
a ‘refugee’ are not sent back to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened.  
The term ‘refugee’ is defined in Article 1 of the Convention as someone, who: 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.121 
There is a great deal contained in that definition. What is apparent, however, is that it does not 
explicitly offer protection to people that have been displaced by climatic disasters.122 
VI A MATTER OF APPLICATION 
In the case of Mr Teitiota it was the important task of the refugee and protection officers and 
the New Zealand Courts to determine whether he met the requirements of Article 1 of the 
Convention. Two primary criteria needed to be met. Firstly, it was necessary to establish 
whether Mr Teitiota would be ‘persecuted’ on return to his country of nationality123 and, if 
answered in the affirmative, the second issue was whether the persecution would be as a 
consequence of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. If Mr Teitiota could convince the Court of each, he could expect to be offered 
the protection generally proffered under the Refugee Convention. 
A A Legal Term 
There can be, however, a mismatch between common understandings and legal definition of 
the term ‘refugee’. The term ‘refugee’ evokes images of people, in distress, fleeing from war, 
from disasters, from famine, drought, and flood, but the novelty of Mr Teitiota’s case warranted 
careful consideration of the legal term. Arguably, and this appears to have been the position of 
the courts, to categorise people as being displaced because of the impacts of environment and 
climate as a ‘refugee’, misapplies the term. It must be recognised that ‘refugee’ is a legal term; 
that is, it has a fixed and known legal meaning that confines its application to certain factual 
circumstances. The term has been called a ‘legal term of art’,124 and is set out in the Convention 
and interpreted in the relative jurisdictions. In having a legal definition, there are requirements 
or elements that must be satisfied in order for it to apply. It was in consideration of these 
requirements that the New Zealand courts found use of the term refugee in Mr Teitiota’s 
                                                     
121 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) art 
1A(2), read in conjunction with Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 
1967, entered into force 4 October 1967). 
122 Tim Kovach, ‘Stop Using the Term “Environmental Refugee”’ on Tim Kovach  (13 May 2013) 
<http://timkovach.com/wp/2013/05/13/stop-using-the-term-environmental-refugee/>. 
123 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) art 
1A(2), read in conjunction with Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered 
into force 4 October 1967). 
124 McAdam, ‘Climate Change, Displacement and the Role of International Law and Policy’, above n 102, 2. 
QUT Law Review Volume 15, Issue 2, 2015 
 
Page | 112 
 
circumstances to be conceptually inaccurate125 and ‘misconceived’,126 in that the factual 
circumstances provided no evidence to support the legal interpretation and ‘bring him within 
the Convention’.127  On considering the definition, it was not difficult for the courts to conclude 
that Mr Teitiota did not satisfy the definition of a ‘refugee’ for the purposes of the Convention 
and was therefore not entitled to protection. 
B Voluntary Resettlement 
Before looking at how the court dealt with the term, one question that needs to be asked is 
whether Mr Teitiota’s situation was nothing more than that of a person internally displaced as 
opposed to that of an international refugee. A person can only become a refugee once that 
person has crossed an international border out of his or her country of origin, otherwise, it is a 
matter of internal displacement128 and as previously raised, a matter for which responsibility 
lies with the person’s homeland government.  After all, not all of Kiribati is prone to inundation.  
For example, the highest point on Banaba Island, which is part of Kiribati, is 81 metres high.129 
There were locations within Kiribati where Mr Teitiota would not be exposed to imminent 
danger. The New Zealand courts accepted that ‘there was no evidence establishing the 
environmental conditions Mr Teitiota faced or was likely to face on return to Kiribati were so 
parlous as to jeopardise his life or mean he and his family would be unable to resume their prior 
subsistence life with dignity.’130 
Clearly, Mr Teitiota had crossed an international border; after all, he made his claim while he 
was in New Zealand. It was also apparent that there might have been a basis to Mr Teitiota’s 
claim that he would be displaced because of the impacts of natural hazards affecting his home.  
The difficulty with the claim is this: might Mr Teitiota just as well have relocated himself 
internally (acknowledging that there would be issues with finding appropriate accommodation 
and employment) and in such a way that was not representative of, or in the nature of, refugee 
flight?   
Mr Teitiota was outside his country when he made his claim. Nonetheless it must be asked 
whether there was a need for him to be outside his country or whether the protection he sought 
could not be equally afforded him in his own country. Equally, was it fear or simply personal 
choice that brought Mr Teitiota to New Zealand  that is, was Mr Teitiota's relocation to New 
Zealand nothing more than voluntary adaptive migration?131 The Convention does not cover 
individuals simply in search of better living conditions. For someone who is faced only with 
internal displacement, it is the responsibility of that person’s homeland government to protect 
him or her under its domestic law. If an I-Kiribati is dissatisfied with his or her government's 
response to the impacts of these natural hazards, then there are democratic mechanisms 
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available to seek to effect change. Mr Teitiota’s failure to engage in the use of these 
mechanisms could have reflected poorly on his decision to flee. In any respect, his protection, 
as we will see, was not something that a foreign government could provide under the 
Convention, regardless of the sympathy and concern it might have for the plight of Mr Teitiota. 
In Mr Teitiota’s case, the New Zealand government simply did not have jurisdiction to act. 
C Basis for a Claim 
Although climate change is cited, when examining the content of Mr Teitiota’s case, confusion 
can arise as to the exact basis from which the claim derived. It is apparent that ‘the impacts of 
unmanaged urbanisation, a continuing crisis of inadequate sanitation, a lack of solid waste 
disposal controls and ineffective freshwater management’132 is a significant environmental 
issue in Kiribati. In Tarawa, freshwater resources particularly are affected by human impacts 
of development.133 Taking an adversarial stance, one might suggest it was incorrect  in fact, it 
was invalid  to speak of climate change as being the cause of Mr Teitiota’s desire to relocate.  
If the impact of climate on the environment in Kiribati is accepted, it must also be accepted 
that the impacts would only exacerbate his homeland's existing economic and environmental 
vulnerabilities. Perhaps it was not climate change from which Mr Teitiota was seeking refuge.  
Perhaps it was the degradation of the environment and the consequent economic pressure that 
it would put on Mr Teitiota from which he was seeking refuge. Climate change may bring the 
tipping point ever closer, but was it the cause of Mr Teitiota’s flight?  Perhaps Mr Teitiota was 
not a refugee at all. Perhaps Mr Teitiota was merely the unfortunate victim of economic and 
environmental hardship; certainly, his situation reflects one of the underlying issues of 
pinpointing climate change as the ‘single phenomena’ causing displacement in such 
circumstances.134 
In any event, and even if it were accepted that climate change was the cause of Mr Teitiota’s  
troubles, it would become necessary to determine at what point these incremental impacts 
caused Mr Teitiota to became a climate-displaced person. At what point can it be said, ‘As of 
today, Mr Teitiota has become a climate-displaced person and therefore must be afforded 
protection?’ Certainly, if we are looking for specific indicators, there was no order issued for 
Mr Teitiota’s arrest, no declaration that Mr Teitiota was of a certain class whose rights were 
restricted and whose safety was threatened. Does the fact that someone one day decides, ‘This 
is intolerable, I am leaving!’ define that person as a refugee and differentiate him or her from 
his or her neighbour who decides to remain and seeks to adapt in situ? It is also necessary to 
consider whether it matters that a person is fleeing from the impacts of climate change rather 
than the impacts of a single weather event.135 The Convention provides no more protection from 
climate catastrophes than it does from inclement weather. It is within domestic law that we 
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expect to find legal frameworks equipped to respond to environment-related movements and 
impacts from the slow onset process of climate change impacts, not the Convention. 
D A Persecutor 
To be found to be a refugee, Mr Teitiota was required to demonstrate, at the very least, that he 
had a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’.136 Although it is accepted in the New Zealand 
context that the definition of refugee is deemed to be examined as a holistic one, it is still 
necessary to examine the elements of the definition and their relationships to each other.137 In 
light of this, the term ‘persecution’ is not defined in the Convention, although it is articulated 
in domestic law.138 Section 91R of Australia’s Migration Act 1958 (Cth), provides a ‘statutory 
definition’139 that suggests Article 1 of the Convention does not apply unless one of the reasons 
for persecution in the Convention is the essential and significant reason for the persecution.  
This is not the case in New Zealand, where s 129 of the Immigration Act 2009 places no rider 
on the definition for persecution.  
The persecution must also involve serious harm to the person, the fear of it must be ‘well-
founded’,140 and the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct affecting 
a human right. If any one of these elements is missing, a person cannot be found to be 
persecuted and therefore cannot be found to be a refugee. When we imagine persecution, we 
are driven to consider violations of human rights  serious violations. However, for persecution 
to occur, we need firstly ‘sustained and systemic violation of a core’141 or a ‘basic human 
right’142 that is at risk of restriction. We need to understand the nature and severity of that 
restriction, and we need to know what the likelihood is that the restriction will be imposed on 
the individual. What is the right held by Mr Teitiota that was being restricted? In what law, 
what treaty, what customary international law is the right enshrined?  The case relied on a right 
to a ‘healthy environment’143 and, while a developing concept, it is questionable whether it yet 
has the jurisprudential recognition sufficient to maintain the basis for such a claim.144  
Certainly, in the New Zealand context, human agency is the requisite145 of a positive finding of 
persecution. Human agency requires someone to carry out the persecution, and in such a case, 
it can come about in the failure of a homeland government to take steps to reduce the risk of 
harm carried out by non-state actors.146 The question here is, ‘Who is the persecutor?’  
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Mr Teitiota’s argument is that the world’s carbon emitters are his persecutor.147 While agents 
of persecution may be state as well as non-state actors,148 states that emit greenhouse gases do 
so typically to advance their own economic development, not to cause direct negative impacts 
on other states.149 Even if the persecutor could be said to be the producer of greenhouse gas 
emissions leading to Mr Teitiota’s suffering, it is more likely that such emissions originate 
from New Zealand150 or Australia, rather than being directed on Mr Teitiota from a perpetrator 
within his homeland. In real terms, Kiribati is one of the lowest emitters in the world151 so it 
cannot be the persecutor, whereas The Land Court of Queensland in 2014 heard that the Alpha 
Mine in the Galilee Basin alone would ultimately produce 0.16 per cent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions,152 with Australia being generally responsible for about 1 per cent of the world’s 
CO2 emissions. Equally, the Kiribati Government had ‘taken steps’ to protect its citizens but 
was ‘powerless to stop sea-level rise’.153 It therefore cannot be valid to say that Mr Teitiota had 
suffered some indirect form of persecution because climate change is caused by humans. If the 
factual circumstances were different, such that environmental degradation had caused ‘threats 
to security, violence, or were utilised for the purposes of oppressive conduct’,154 the case might 
have attracted an alternative outcome.155   
For the claim of persecution to have succeeded, Mr Teitiota would have had to have been 
‘targeted’, or part of a specific class prescribed in the Convention. Climate change, however, 
affects everyone regardless of race, regime, nationality, membership, political opinion, and in 
this case, by Mr Teitiota’s own admission, it affects the entirety of the Kiribati population in 
general.156 That is to say, if an Australian resident were to relocate suddenly to Mr Teitiota’s 
homeland, the person would be equally affected.  Any ‘persecution’ in Mr Teitiota’s case 
results solely from the fact of geographical circumstance and that is not a determinant for 
refugee status under the Convention. The point is that climate change is not targeted; it is 
indiscriminate, and it has yet to be demonstrated that it is in any way systematic.   
We return to the question of timing and ask at what point it could be said that the persecution 
had occurred. Mr Teitiota was seeking to avoid the worst impacts of climate change - impacts 
yet to come. Arguably, Mr Teitiota could not yet obtain the status of a refugee because any 
persecution had yet to commence. The Convention does not provide for pre-emptive protection.  
Fear of persecution must be ‘well-founded’, not merely anticipated.    
While climate change might be said to have a negative impact on any number of rights, the 
impact cannot be attributed to one of the grounds of the Convention. There is no form of 
motivation behind climate change, at least none that can be linked to one of the grounds.  The 
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law does not protect a person who is affected by environmental factors.157 A person affected by 
environmental factors is not a refugee because that person is not targeted. There is no 
discrimination with climate change and, therefore, there is no persecution. 
VII A MATTER OF JURISDICTION 
It is questionable as to whether either a New Zealand or Australian court has the jurisdictional 
power to expand the scope of the definition of refugee beyond its original purpose. It is a matter 
for the ‘member states’, as parties to the Convention, to determine how the relevant articles are 
to be interpreted.158 In New Zealand, the Refugee Convention is incorporated into the 
Immigration Act 2009.159 Under the Act, a person must fall within the definition provided by 
the Refugee Convention to qualify for refugee status. The articles were drafted to ensure that 
persons suffering abuse and human rights violations could find protection in other states when 
their own government would not assist them. While undoubtedly climate change may have a 
significant impact on people, particularly those who reside in the small island states of the 
Pacific, there does not appear to be any evidence to support an argument that the drafters of the 
Convention envisaged protection against environmental degradation. Extending the definition 
of a ‘refugee’ to cover persons fleeing from natural disaster or other detrimental environmental 
impacts, including those caused by climate change, would constitute a significant alteration of 
the scope of the Convention.   
The question then is whether the Convention should be extended? Perhaps, but with respect, 
that is a task that should not be carried out by a domestic court, but should be left to the nations 
of the world in the event that they believe a change to international law is required.  
In Australia, it is even less likely that Mr Teitiota would have gained a positive outcome for 
his claim. Australia takes a slightly different approach in its incorporation of the relevant 
Convention articles into domestic law. Rather than leaving the interpretation of the relevant 
article open, it specifically defines the meaning of persecution,160 relying on a narrower161 and 
potentially more ‘burdensome’162 interpretation. The purpose for the insertion of this definition, 
according to the Explanatory Notes, was to limit the expanding application of Article 1(2A),163 
to keep it in line with agreed international obligations, and to ensure that the interpretation did 
not ‘provide for circumstances that are clearly outside those originally intended’.164 Such 
circumstances, it is stated, include situations ‘where hardship and serious inconvenience have 
been considered to be persecution’.165  It is clear from Australia’s general policy on refugees 
and cross border migrants that an interpretation of the article with any degree of pliancy will 
not be countenanced. 
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VIII A MATTER OF CREATING RECOGNITION 
For now, it is evident that the uncertainty and lack of an international legal framework to 
adequately respond to cross border displacement arising from climate change impacts presents 
what Jose Riera, senior advisor in the UNCHR, describes as a ‘gaping legal hole’.166 One of the 
key difficulties is the fact that the phrase ‘climate refugee’ is not a term recognised in existing 
international law.167  A number of alternatives have been proposed for the management of those 
displaced across international borders due to the effect of climate change.168 It is unlikely, 
however, that there is a single solution,169 or indeed a single source of solutions,170 given the 
‘inherent difficulty in conceptualizing and accurately describing the phenomenon’ of climate 
change-related movement.171 Each solution posed has its shortcomings.172  
A Domestic Law 
Are there other provisions currently existing in domestic law that could cater for ‘climate 
change refugees’?  In Australasia, ‘humanitarian provisions’ are present in legislation, although 
they have been tested only to a limited extent and offer no new precedent. In New Zealand for 
example, a statutory provision of the Immigration Act 2009173 that allows for an appeal against 
liability for deportation on exceptional humanitarian grounds has recently been applied where 
climate change was raised as a factor.174 However, the decision to allow the subject family to 
stay was based on a myriad of factors; with no one factor taking precedence.175 The final 
discretionary decision revolved around the claimant’s close family ties in New Zealand, and 
related cultural norms associated with family.176 ‘Deep concern’ was raised about the 
vulnerability of the applicant’s young children where, for example, they were unable to access 
suitable drinking water supplies,177 although it was recognised that in this instance they could 
not be considered to be ‘arbitrarily deprived of life’ and that the government was ‘sensitised’ 
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to the needs of the children.178 Australian immigration legislation179 also provides for the issue 
of In-Country Special Humanitarian visas. Such visas are potentially available to those who 
are living in and subject to persecution in their home country, and have not been able to leave 
that country to seek refuge elsewhere.180  To date, there have been no successful applications 
on the grounds that a persecution has arisen from the impacts of climate.181 Despite this, it may 
be reasonable when considering an application to take into account the wide humanitarian 
grounds for approval that climate change may present.  
In New Zealand, there has been contention over whether the currently available ballot system 
is a mechanism for admitting those displaced by the impacts of climate change. While such a 
system may be an option and one that Australia could consider, the New Zealand government 
has made it clear that providing protection for ‘climate refugees’ is not its purpose.182 The 
current Pacific Access Visa Category offers an annual quota system for accepting peoples from 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Kiribati on grounds unrelated to those of climate change displacement.183  
This system requires a number of residence criteria to be met, including residency within one 
of the subject countries, and an offer of employment with sufficient income level, as well as 
meeting health and character requirements.184  It is worth noting that it is has been reported that, 
prior to Mr Teitiota’s claim, New Zealand had already accepted ‘environmental refugees’ from 
Kiribati,185 but that is not entirely correct.  A number of people from Kiribati, Tuvalu and Tonga 
have been chosen by ballot under the Pacific Access Category to settle in New Zealand each 
year,186 but it has occurred under what has been described as ‘an economic rather than a 
humanitarian migration policy’.187  
Of course, individual nations can alter domestic laws to find their own solutions. To this end, 
Australia was urged in 2013 to ready itself for future cross border migration by preparing a 
‘new migration category for those fleeing the effects of climate change’.188 In 2006, Senator 
Bartlett introduced the Migration Legislation Amendment (Complementary Protection Visas) 
Bill 2006,189 which sought to establish a new category of visa to deal with people who did not 
meet the definition for refugee under the Convention, but for humanitarian or safety reasons 
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could not return to their homeland.190 Then in 2007, Senator Kerry Nettle for the Australian 
Greens, proposed an amendment to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that would introduce a new 
visa category  climate change refugee visas  under the since lapsed Migration (Climate 
Refugees) Amendment Bill 2007 (Cth).191 Under Senator Nettle’s Bill, a person displaced 
because of ‘climate change induced environmental disaster’192 might find refuge under the new 
provision.  The reason the Bill failed to pass was not that the parties felt Australia did not have 
a responsibility to assist those forcibly displaced  each of the parties voiced concern about 
this.  The problem was the varied perceptions on levels of accountability and how to implement 
a solution.193 
B International ‘Solutions’ 
At an international level, alternative solutions have been proposed to fill the legal hole.  Notably 
in the first instance, the language has changed and extended to incorporate those impacted by 
not only climate change, but by disaster.194 In terms of instruments, while the initial focus was 
on expanding the definition of refugee at international law, the scope has now widened. 
Nonetheless, some support is still evident in academic circles for extending the ‘logic’ of the 
Convention definition to incorporate some climate impacted individuals.195 Equally the creation 
of a new treaty instrument, or a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’), has also been mooted. McAdam, among others, queries the 
efficacy of the treaty approach, in part due to difficulties evident in ‘defining those intended to 
be covered by it’, the misplaced focus on cross-border migration, as well as the ability to gain 
consensus and agreement by those who would be a party to it.196 Instead, broader frameworks 
and initiatives, which incorporate not only individuals, but which recognise the multiple 
typologies of climate-affected persons, regional differences, and priorities and collective 
impacts, are called for.197 In this vein, bilateral and regional agreements and soft-law 
declarations and principles may be more relevant.198 The recently endorsed ‘Agenda for the 
Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the context of Disasters and Climate Change’, 
highlights the efforts some States have already made in adopting a more flexible approach,  
applying ‘regular migration categories’, granting ‘temporary stay arrangements’, and wider 
applications of current refugee law.199 Despite the work completed to date, it is evident that 
analysis of appropriate mechanisms for managing displacement is still underway. 
C Loss and Damage Mechanisms 
As solutions are mooted for managing short and long-term climate displacement, a proposition 
has been put forward to create a governing body to develop arrangements concerning loss and 
damage related to climate change. The draft proposal, under review for the 21st Conference of 
the Parties (‘COP21’) to the UNFCCC, supports creation of a governing body to develop 
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arrangements related to loss and damage through the establishment of a climate change 
displacement coordination facility.200 The mechanism on which it is based, the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (‘Loss 
and Damage Mechanism’) promotes implementation of approaches to address loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including facilitating action to address 
how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human 
mobility.201 The two options are to affirm the commitment to continuing to implement the Loss 
and Damage mechanism and; create a new mechanism with a mandate that includes creating 
the climate change related displacement coordination facility. The establishment of the facility 
could have tremendous influence on how members respond to and act to prevent climate change 
related displacement. Conclusions on the draft proposal will be unknown until COP21 has 
taken place in late 2015.  
IX CONCLUSION 
When Cyclone Heta struck Niue in January 2004, the island was devastated. Waves exceeded 
50 metres in height, washing away whole buildings, destroying the island’s biodiversity and its 
fishing grounds.202 The post-crisis trauma of the cyclone would no doubt have been 
significant,203 but Heta formed and then dissipated within a matter of days.204 The winds 
subsided, the sea fell back, and the Niueans rebuilt. The onset of climate change induced sea 
level rise is slow.  There is not the sudden onset of a cyclone,205 but neither does it end, and nor 
do the seas subside.  There is nowhere to rebuild. The ‘psychological trauma’ of having to 
permanently relocate homes and an entire culture is likely to be ‘severe’.206 It is little wonder 
then that people in Pacific small island states are looking to the international community in 
their pursuit of a solution. It is not surprising they would look for others who have been forcibly 
displaced from their homeland, and that they would see that the Convention had given those 
refugees protection. Nor is it surprising that I-Kiribati would seek protection for themselves 
under its articles.   
What may be surprising to those exiled by climate change impacts, however, is that at 
international law there is no definitive instrument within the folios of which they can find 
shelter.  Those fundamental ‘rights’ to life, food, and water that are disrupted by climate change 
become impalpable and obscure in the corpus of international law. The Convention is no 
exception. It is explicit and restrictive as to the category of person it protects, and the essential 
elements of the Convention are neither intended, nor designed, to accommodate those forcibly 
displaced by climate change. Those seeking refuge in Australia will find the door securely 
                                                     
200 Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, ‘Draft Negotiating Text for the Paris 
Agreement’, para 36 <http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-9_i3_11jun2015t1630_np.pdf>. 
201 United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change, Loss and Damage  
<http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/8132.php>. 
202 Jon Barnett and Heidi Ellemor, ‘Niue After Cyclone Heta’ (2007) 22(1) The Australian Journal of Emergency 
Management 3, 3.  
203 UNICEF Pacific Office, ‘Niue. A Situation Analysis of Children, Women and Youth’ (2005) viii 
<http://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/Niue_Sitan_Report_Latest_pdf.pdf>. 
204 Gary Padget et al, Monthly Global Tropical Cyclone Summary (January 2004) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20060822223953/http://www.australiasevereweather.com/cyclones/2004/summ040
1.txt>.  
205 ‘Aid Team Flies Gravely Injured Baby From Cyclone-Hit Niue’ The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 9 
January 2004  <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/01/08/1073437413342.html?from=storyrhs>.  
206 Justin T Locke, ‘Climate Change Induced Migration In The Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis And Long Term 
Developments’ (2009) 175(3) Geographical Journal 171, 177. 
QUT Law Review Volume 15, Issue 2, 2015 
 
Page | 121 
 
sealed by its immigration legislation, although it had never been opened by the Convention in 
any event. Nor can it be opened unless the signatories to the Convention agree to amend it. 
People like Mr Teitiota and his family are worthy of protection, and the decision against him 
‘did not mean that environmental degradation resulting from climate change or other natural 
disasters could never create a pathway into the Refugee Convention’.207 Nevertheless, it is yet 
to be established that the Convention is a mechanism available to actually provide protection 
and in any event, the Convention is not a legal doctrine to be extended by domestic courts.  
Justices Stevens, Wild and Miller of the New Zealand Court of Appeal settled the matter, when 
their Honours confirmed that:208 
… the effects of climate change … do not bring Mr Teitiota within the Convention. That is the 
position even if the most sympathetic, ambulatory approach permissible to interpreting the 
Convention is taken. The Convention is quite simply not the solution to Kiribati’s problem. 
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